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NOTES
AomnATY LAw-CoNTRACT oF MARINE INSURANCE WITMN STATE INSURANCE LAW
RATBER ThEr Fmxasr4 A matALTY LAw.-Jurisdiction of admiralty causes is vested
in the federal judiciary by the United States Constitution.1 This jurisdiction is im-
plemented by federal legislation pursuant to the "necessary and proper" clause of
the Constitution.2  The purpose of the special Constitutional provision regarding
admiralty jurisdiction was the establishment of a uniform body of federal maritime
law, in contradistinction to the provision regarding commerce,3 wherein an area
of regulation was left to the States.4  Congress has enacted a "saving to suitors"
provision 5 under which common law remedies may be pursued in State Court actions
of a maritime nature, although the substantive general admiralty law must be applied.0
The admiralty jurisdiction has been held to extend to all navigable waters of the
United States and it has been established that a contract of marine insurance is a
maritime contract and is thus cognizable under the admiralty jurisdiction.t
In spite of the well-recognized principle that there must be a uniform admiralty
law, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Firemen's Fund Insurance Co.8 held that there is no judicially established federal
admiralty law governing the marine insurance policy terms which were in question,
declined to establish such a law, and held on authority of Hooper v. CalijorniaO and
Nutting v. Massachusetts'0 (both non-admiralty cases) and the McCarran Act 11 that
the States have the power to regulate marine insurance in addition to other insur-
ance. 12 The theory that terms of a marine insurance contract must be strictly per-
formed was rejected as not having been established as part of the body of federal
admiralty law, despite the minority opinion that a rule of strict performance has been
1 U. S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2: "The judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
2 U. S. CONS?. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment of Officer thereof."
3 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes; . . ."
4 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 299 (1851); Knickerbocker
Inc. Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438, 64 L. Ed. 834 (1920).
5 28 U. S. C. § 1333: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, ex-
clusive of the courts of the States of (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are other-
wise entitled."
6 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., et al., 317 U. S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246, 87
L. Ed. 239 (1942).
7 Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 1 (1870).
8 348 U. S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368, 99 L. Ed. 281 (1955).
9 155 U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1894).
10 183 U. S. 552, 22 S. Ct. 238, 46 L. Ed. 324 (1901).
11 15 U. S. C. § 1011: "Congress declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States."
12 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 168 (1868).
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established in the admiralty law of this country and the citation of a number of
cases therein supporting this view.13
In the Wilburn case three brothers, merchants in Denison, Texas, bought a small
houseboat in Mississippi for the purpose of carrying passengers on Lake Texoma, an
artificial lake situated between Texas and Oklahoma. After the vessel was insured
against fire and other hazards by defendant insurance company and brought from
Mississippi, title was transferred to plaintiff, a corporation owned by the Wilburn
brothers, original purchasers of the houseboat. Subsequently, the vessel was destroyed
by fire while moored on Lake Texoma.
Defendant denied liability on the ground of breach of the policy terms prohibit-
ing subsequent mortgaging or sale of the vessel or use of the vessel for other than
private pleasure purposes, contending that these were valid terms of marine insur-
ance under the general admiralty law. Admitting breach of the policy terms, plain-
tiff sought recovery on the insurance contract upon the theory that the policy pro-
visions breached were unenforceable under the insurance statutes of Texas.14
The major issue presented by the Wilburn case is whether the regulation of the
terms of a marine insurance policy may constitutionally be controlled by the States,
regardless of whether a rule requiring literal fulfillment of every policy term has
been established.
The importance of a general maritime law cannot be minimized. The framers of
the Constitution, in order to secure this uniformity, did not leave maritime affairs
to the commerce clause, but included a special provision, completely pre-empting the
entire field of admiralty jurisdiction.1 5 In the words of Mr. justice Story: "The
advantages resulting to the commerce and navigation of the United States, from a
uniformity of rules and decisions in all maritime questions, authorize us to believe
that national policy, as well as juridical logic, require the clause of the constitution
to be so construed, as to embrace all maritime contracts, torts and injuries, or, in
other words, to embrace all those causes, which originally and inherently belonged to
the admiralty, before any statutable restriction."' 6 The following quotation from
The Lottawanna further expresses the same principle: "The constitution must have
13 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., supra, note 8 at 326.
14 Vernon's Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 4890 (1936): "Any provision in any policy of
insurance issued by any company subject to the provision of this law to the effect
that if said property shall be encumbered by a lien of any character or shall after
the issuance of such policy become encumbered by a lien of any character then such
encumbrance shall render such policy void and shall be of no force and effect. Any
such provision within or placed on any such policy shall be null and void."
Vernon's Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 4930 (1936): "No breach or violation by the in-
sured of any warranty, condition or provision of any fire insurance policy, contract
of insurance, or application therefor, upon personal property, shall render void the
policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a suit for loss thereon, unless such
breach or violation contributed to bring about the destruction of the property."
Vernon's Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 5054 (1936): "Any Contract of insurance paya-
ble to any citizen or inhabitant of this State by any insurance company or corpora-
tion doing business within this State shall be held to be a contract made and
entered into under and by virtue of the laws of this State relating to insurance and
governed thereby, notwithstanding such policy or contract of insurance may provide
that the contract was executed and the premiums and policy (in case it becomes a
demand) should be payable without this State, or at the home office of the company
or corporation issuing the same."
15 See note 1 supra.
16 DeLovio v. Bolt, 2 Gall. 399, 443, F. C. No. 3,776 (1815).
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referred to a system of law co-extensive with, and operating uniformly in the whole
country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits
of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that would
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the constitution aimed on
all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each
other or with foreign states."17
The reason given by the Court in the Wilburn case for its refusal to consider a
federal admiralty rule regarding policy terms of marine insurance, was that the field
of insurance regulation has been left to the States with the consent of Congress,1 8
although it is considered that Congress has the power to regulate insurance under the
commerce clause of the Constitution.'9 This is plainly a confusion of the mutually
exclusive provisions of the Constitution governing commerce on the one hand and ad-
miralty on the other. The McCarran Act was passed for the purpose of declaring the
Congressional intent that regulation of insurance should remain in the States. How-
ever, it would seem that the McCarran Act does not authorize the States to super-
sede the general maritime law as to the force and validity of the terms of marine
insurance contracts, but was passed for a different purpose. The interpretation given
to the McCarran Act by the Supreme Court in the Wilburn case gives permission to
the States to revive the diversity of State control in the substantive admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. Thus interpreted, it defeats the purpose of Article III, Sec. 2,
and exceeds the powers of Congress.
The minority opinion statement in the Wilburn case, that "When State power
intrudes upon the uniformity imposed by federal law, its exercise is invalid when
applied to maritime litigation .... -20 seems to be the only tenable position in
light of the origin and development of the admiralty jurisdiction in the United
States.
ANTITRUST LAw-MULTsTATE THEATRE BUSINESS HELD TO CONSTITUTE "TRADE OR COM-
IIERCE" UNDER SHERmAN Acr.-Defendants, multistate operators of legitimate theatres,
were charged with violation of the Sherman Act. The Federal District Court dis-
missed the government's action on motion, on the ground that defendants were not en-
gaged in interstate commerce. The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the dismissal
below, held that the business of producing, booking and presenting legitimate theatre
attractions on a multistate basis constitutes trade or commerce within the meaning of
the Sherman Act, and remanded the case for trial on the issues.1
The defendants in this action were three individuals and three corporations con-
trolled by them, engaged in all phases of the legitimate theatre business, including
the production of plays in New York and in cities all over the country. They own
theatres in many of these cities, and were alleged to have discriminated in favor of
their own productions when booking plays into their houses. In a criminal complaint,
the government charged them with conspiracy to prevent competition, in violation of
17 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 558, 575 (1874).
Is See note 11 supra.
19 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n. 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct.
1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
20 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., supra note 8, at 335.
1 United States v. Shubert, 348 U. S. 222, 75 S. Ct 277, 99 L. Ed. 213 (1955).
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sections one and two of the Sherman Act,2 which sections in essence prohibit combi-
nations in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, and monopoliza-
tion or attempted monopolization of said trade or commerce.
On motion to dismiss, defendants argued that their business did not constitute
"trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The district court
granted the motion, citing Toolson v. New York Yankees,3 a case in which the
Supreme Court recently followed per curiam an earlier holding 4 that baseball games
performed for profit were not subject to federal anti-trust laws. In the earlier case5
Mr. Justice Holmes states that in the case of baseball, the transportation across
state lines was merely incidental in nature and did not go to the essence of the trans-
action. Essentially the transactions or games are performed in one or more individual
places within individual states and each game is separate and distinct. The unique type of
organization existing in professional baseball was cited as one of the controlling reasons
for the special treatment of this industry. There was a strong dissent in both of the above
cited baseball cases which looked beyond the superficial organization of the game. How-
ever, in the Toolson case6 the court pointed out that there had been a considerable
period of time in which Congress could have legislated against immunity for the game,
and that failure so to act was an indication to the court that stare- decisis should
control. Therefore, the district court held that, by analogy, the defendants' business
did not amount to "commerce."
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, stating that there was no valid reason to
extend this immunity to interstate theatres and pointed out that Mr. Justice Holmes
himself, did not extend immunity to fields other than baseball. In the case of Hart
v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange,7 where the theatre was involved, he declared
for the court that the issue of the incidental nature of transportation across state
lines was one of fact for a court to determine.
Many enterprises not usually thought of as being trade or commerce have been
judicially declared to be such. Production, distribution and exhibition of motion
pictures,8 medical services to members of a health co-operative, 9 insurance underwrit-
ing,10 and real estate brokerage"l have all been held to come within the term "trade
and commerce" by the United States Supreme Court. In the case of United States v.
American Medical Association,12 Chief Judge Groner of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia concluded that the term trade embraced "all occupations in which
men are engaged for a livelihood." (However, Mr. Justice Douglas in the Real Estate
2 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2.
3 346 U. S. 356, 74 S. Ct. 78, 98 L. Ed. 64 (1953).
4 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U. S. 200, 42 S. Ct. 465, 66 L. Ed. 898 (1922).
5 Ibid.
6 See note 3 supra.
7 262 U. S. 271, 43 S. Ct. 540, 67 L. Ed. 977 (1923).
8 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 68 S. Ct. 915, 92 L. Ed.
1260 (1948).
9 American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 63 S. Ct. 326,
87 L. Ed. 434 (1943).
10 United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct.
1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
11 United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485,
70 S. Ct. 711, 94 L. Ed. 1007 (1950).
12 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 72 App. D. C. 12, 16-20, 110 F. 2d
703 (1940).
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Board case13 intimated that such a wide definition would not be applicable to the
professions).
There have been several instances in which the New York courts have specifically
held the theatre business not to be trade or commerce. It has been held in a crimi-
nal case that owning, controlling and leasing theatres, producing plays and booking
contracts were acts not constituting commerce. 14 In another New York criminal
prosecution charging defendant with conspiracy to commit acts injurious to trade
or commerce15 it was held in People v. Klaw' 6 that the producing of plays and enter-
tainments and the booking of contracts for the production of said plays is not trade
or commerce. The court in the Klaw case cited as authorities decisions by Mr. Jus-
tice Strong17 and Chief Justice John Marshall.18 However, both of these latter cases
predate the Sherman Act and cannot fairly be held to apply squarely to its interpre-
tation.
At present it appears that the immunity of baseball from anti-trust legislation is
unique. This immunity is due almost solely to the influence of Mr. Justice Holmes.
His attitude toward anti-trust legislation, in at least one stage of his career, was
summed up in a letter written to Sir Frederick Pollock in 1910, in which he said,
"(o)f course I enforce whatever constitutional laws Congress or anybody else sees
fit to pass, and so in good faith to the best of my ability-but I do not disguise
my belief that the Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and in-
competence."' 9 With this attitude as a background, it is easy to see how the unique
factual situation of the baseball case2o would provide an escape from the strict in-
terpretation of the law to the mind of this most able jurist. However, this attitude
of justice Holmes is not in favor today. If there is to be any trend in this phase of
the law it most probably will be in the direction of the broader interpretation of
Judge Groner.2 '
13 See note 10 supra.
14 People v. Newman, 109 Misc. 622, 180 N. Y. Supp. 892 (Ct. Gen. Sess.,
N. Y. Co., 1919)..
15 L. 1881, c. 676, now N, Y. PENA. L. §§ 580-6.
16 55 Misc. 72, 106 N. Y. Supp. 341 (Ct. Gen. Sess., N. Y. Co., 1907).
'7 Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 128 L. Ed. 527 (1887).
18 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
19 BIDDLE, The Humanism of Justice Holmes, New Republic 14 (April 11, 1955).
20 See note 4 supra.
21 See note 12 supra.
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